China’s Preemptive Diplomacy in South Asia: A Strategic Power Play

In South Asia’s ever-shifting political terrain, where regime changes frequently reshape regional power structures, China has perfected a strategy of calculated engagement. By forging ties with ruling governments and opposition forces, Beijing shields its long-term interests from political turbulence, ensuring continuity regardless of who holds power. From engaging the Taliban in Afghanistan to swiftly adapting to Bangladesh’s new leadership under Muhammad Yunus and strengthening ties with Sri Lanka’s Anura Dissanayake, China’s ability to hedge its diplomatic bets underscores its methodical approach to influence-building.

The 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina after mass protests was a crucial test of China’s agility. Despite a decade-long strategic partnership—marked by Bangladesh’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and billions in Chinese investments—Beijing pivoted swiftly. Within weeks of Yunus assuming office, Chinese diplomats attended his swearing-in and pledged financial support, in stark contrast to India’s cautious response. Significantly, China expanded its outreach to Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), a historically anti-India Islamist party, with Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen publicly lauding its “discipline.”

This dual-track approach—simultaneously backing incumbents while cultivating opposition forces—serves China’s broader strategic objectives. Economically, it safeguards its extensive investments in Bangladesh’s infrastructure, including ports, railways, and special economic zones. Politically, it erodes India’s regional dominance by aligning with factions that perceive New Delhi as an overbearing presence.

China’s Calculated Approach in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s Anura Dissanayake, historically wary of foreign intervention, initially posed a diplomatic challenge for Beijing. However, within months of taking office in 2024, Dissanayake visited China, signed a $3.7 billion oil refinery deal with Sinopec, and reaffirmed Sri Lanka’s commitment to the BRI—projects that had been stalled under previous administrations. China’s diplomatic finesse, framed around principles of sovereignty and non-interference, appealed to Dissanayake’s nationalist and anti-Western rhetoric.

China’s success in Sri Lanka highlights its ability to tailor its diplomatic engagements. By offering financial relief and infrastructure funding without imposing governance-related conditions, Beijing positions itself as an indispensable economic partner. At the same time, it fosters ideological alignment; Dissanayake’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has deepened ties with the Communist Party of China (CPC), reinforcing an alternative to Western-backed governance models.

China’s Expanding Economic and Political Leverage

China’s South Asian strategy rests on three pillars: economic entrenchment, political adaptability, and long-term strategic vision. This approach increasingly challenges India’s traditional influence in the region. Through massive BRI investments, China creates economic dependencies that persist beyond electoral cycles. In Sri Lanka, Beijing accounts for 20% of external debt, while in Bangladesh, it remains the largest trading partner. By embedding itself in critical infrastructure—ports, power plants, and digital networks—China ensures that even leadership changes do not disrupt its hold.

Unlike Western democracies, China avoids linking investments to governance or human rights conditions. Instead, it engages pragmatically with a spectrum of political actors—Islamists, Marxists, and authoritarian regimes alike—emphasizing mutual economic benefits and sovereignty. This ideological flexibility allows Beijing to position itself as a counterweight to India’s influence. In Bangladesh, it amplifies anti-India narratives, while in Sri Lanka, it presents BRI projects as an alternative to Indian-led initiatives.

China’s Influence as a Strategic Challenge to India

China’s preemptive diplomacy in South Asia is driven by a cold, strategic calculation of regional volatility. By diversifying its political engagements, Beijing ensures that no regime change derails its long-term access to markets, resources, and strategic infrastructure. However, this approach prioritizes stability for China’s interests rather than sustainable development for host nations.

China’s claim of adhering to a strict policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of South Asian nations is increasingly exposed as a strategic façade. For smaller states in the region, the challenge lies in maximizing Chinese investment without relinquishing policy autonomy. Unlike in other regions, where China primarily competes with the West, South Asia sees China directly challenging India’s traditional influence.

Bangladesh serves as a case study in Beijing’s strategic maneuvering. While China maintained strong ties with former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—who notably made her last foreign visit to Beijing before her ouster—India now bears the brunt of the political fallout in Dhaka. This showcases China’s ability to manipulate narratives and shift political blame onto regional rivals.

For India and its Western partners, countering China’s expanding influence requires a proactive rather than reactive approach. China’s tactics are no longer confined to economic investment but extend to shaping political discourse and controlling narratives. The struggle for dominance in South Asia is no longer purely ideological; it spans economics, politics, security, and culture. The question remains: can India and its allies preempt Beijing’s next diplomatic move before it solidifies an unchallenged grip over the region?